- #Wanted weapons of fate pc resolution change archive
- #Wanted weapons of fate pc resolution change series
With the grace of one grown practiced at public remorse, the President gripped the lectern with both hands and looked across the dais at the Rwandan officials and survivors who surrounded him. The United States in fact did virtually nothing "to try to limit what occurred." Indeed, staying out of Rwanda was an explicit U.S. officials shunned the term "genocide," for fear of being obliged to act. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans were being butchered each day, U.S. It refused to use its technology to jam radio broadcasts that were a crucial instrument in the coordination and perpetuation of the genocide. It aggressively worked to block the subsequent authorization of UN reinforcements. It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers who were already in Rwanda. In reality the United States did much more than fail to send troops. This implied that the United States had done a good deal but not quite enough. He spoke to the crowd assembled on the tarmac at Kigali Airport: "We come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the United States and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred" in Rwanda. In March of 1998, on a visit to Rwanda, President Clinton issued what would later be known as the "Clinton apology," which was actually a carefully hedged acknowledgment. government knew enough about the genocide early on to save lives, but passed up countless opportunities to intervene. This material provides a clearer picture than was previously possible of the interplay among people, motives, and events. documents, this account also draws on hundreds of pages of newly available government records.
#Wanted weapons of fate pc resolution change archive
Thanks to the National Security Archive ( a nonprofit organization that uses the Freedom of Information Act to secure the release of classified U.S. It also reflects dozens of interviews with Rwandan, European, and United Nations officials and with peacekeepers, journalists, and nongovernmental workers in Rwanda. The account that follows is based on a three-year investigation involving sixty interviews with senior, mid-level, and junior State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council officials who helped to shape or inform U.S. failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide by claiming that the United States didn't know what was happening, that it knew but didn't care, or that regardless of what it knew there was nothing useful to be done. government demanding that the United States do more? If so, why weren't they heeded? And most crucial, what could the United States have done to save lives? policy? Why did they decide (or decide not to decide) as they did? Were any voices inside or outside the U.S. Why did the United States not do more for the Rwandans at the time of the killings? Did the President really not know about the genocide, as his marginalia suggested? Who were the people in his Administration who made the life-and-death decisions that dictated U.S.
As the terror in Rwanda had unfolded, Clinton had shown virtually no interest in stopping the genocide, and his Administration had stood by as the death toll rose into the hundreds of thousands. "How did this happen?" he asked, adding, "I want to get to the bottom of this." The President's urgency and outrage were oddly timed.
"Is what he's saying true?" Clinton wrote with a thick black felt-tip pen beside heavily underlined paragraphs. The articles bore confused, angry, searching queries in the margins. He sent copies of Gourevitch's articles to his second-term national-security adviser, Sandy Berger. President Bill Clinton, a famously avid reader, expressed shock.
#Wanted weapons of fate pc resolution change series
It was the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the twentieth century.Ī few years later, in a series in The New Yorker, Philip Gourevitch recounted in horrific detail the story of the genocide and the world's failure to stop it. Using firearms, machetes, and a variety of garden implements, Hutu militiamen, soldiers, and ordinary citizens murdered some 800,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu. In the course of a hundred days in 1994 the Hutu government of Rwanda and its extremist allies very nearly succeeded in exterminating the country's Tutsi minority.